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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Communist Economic and Military Aid to Syria*

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July 1972

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
July 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO SYRIA

Summary and Conclusions

1. Despite shifting Syrian domestic politics and periodic Syrian-Soviet difficulties, Communist economic and military aid has continued. Since early 1955, Syria has been extended more than \$675 million of military aid and almost \$485 million of economic aid. Damascus is currently the fourth largest Third World recipient of Communist arms, and the Communist countries (mainly the Soviet Union) are practically the sole source of military equipment and training. Marshal Grechko's May visit to Damascus, which probably ended in the signing of an arms agreement, suggests that substantial Soviet arms shipments will continue.

2. The Communist countries also are the chief source of foreign capital for Syria's economic development. During 1966-70, their share of Syria's total public investment was about 17%. Large sums were spent on agriculture, industry, and transportation. Communist aid may represent an even larger share of the present development plan because the Euphrates River project has been accelerated, and Western capital continues to be reluctant to move into Syria. It is also likely that the level of Communist aid will increase.

Discussion

Magnitude of Military Assistance

3. Military aid was Moscow's first vehicle for establishing its influence in Syria; significant economic aid was not extended until the military aid program had become well entrenched. From early 1956 to date,

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

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Communist arms aid commitments have totaled more than \$675 million (see Table 1 below, and Table 6 in the Appendix). Moscow accounts for more than 85% of this amount. Only Egypt, India, and Iraq now rank larger as Third World Communist arms recipients.<sup>(1)</sup> More than \$645 million had been delivered by the end of 1971, about 45% since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Syria has signed several small military agreements with Western countries,<sup>(2)</sup> but, for all practical purposes, it is completely dependent on Soviet arms.

Table 1

## Communist Military Aid Extended to Syria

	Million US \$						
	Total 1956-71	1967-71	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Total	676	304	110	75	14	65	40
USSR	582	255	100	75	-	40	40
Czecho- slovakia	82 <sup>a</sup>	37	10	-	12	15	-
Poland	10	10	-	-	-	10	-
China	2	2	-	-	2	-	-
East Ger- many	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	-	-	-	-

a. Excluding a \$2 million downpayment in 1956.

Early Agreements, 1956-66

4. Syria's first Communist arms accord was a \$37 million agreement with Czechoslovakia signed early in 1956. As with Egypt a year earlier, Prague acted as Moscow's agent, shipping Soviet-made arms from Czechoslovakia. In late 1956, Syria concluded a \$42 million agreement directly with the USSR and signed a \$75 million accord in 1957. After

1. Indonesia also has received more arms than Syria, but that program has been dormant since 1965.

2. Agreements signed in 1968-69 include \$9 million with West Germany (for vehicles and communications equipment); \$1 million with Spain (for truck-mounted recoilless rifles and ammunition); and \$1 million with Italy (for land mines).

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Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958, Cairo assumed control of Communist arms procurement for both regions. When the union broke up in September 1961, Moscow halted shipments to Syria but negotiated a \$60 million agreement with Damascus early the next year.

5. By June 1967 the USSR had extended more than \$325 million of military aid to Syria under six separate agreements and had delivered at least 124 MIG jet fighters, nine SU-7 jet fighter bombers, six IL-28 light jet bombers, 550 medium tanks, 90 self-propelled assault guns, and 550 armored personnel carriers<sup>(3)</sup> (see the photographs, Figures 1 and 2). The



Figure 1. Soviet-built Syrian tank captured by Israel in the June 1967 war



Figure 2. Syrian-manned Soviet-built SU-100 assault gun

3. For a list of major equipment delivered to Syria see Table 7, in the Appendix.

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SA-2 surface-to-air missile system listed under a 1965 accord was not provided until early in 1969. Soviet naval vessels delivered included six Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, two T-43 minesweepers, and 16 P-4 class motor torpedo boats. These vessels still constitute most of Syria's naval inventory.

Agreements Since the June 1967 War

6. From mid-1967 through 1971, Syria signed military aid agreements with the USSR totaling about \$255 million.<sup>(4)</sup> An August 1967 accord for \$100 million included replacements for Syria's substantial equipment losses during the June 1967 War. Damascus lost nearly two-thirds of its combat aircraft and a large part of its land armaments, but large-scale Soviet deliveries in the second half of 1967 replaced most of these losses.

7. Procurement since 1968 has been directed toward expanding and modernizing Syria's armed forces, particularly its air defense system. In 1969 the SA-2 missile system was introduced. A \$40 million agreement concluded in February 1971 provides for the delivery of ZSU-23-4 radar controlled antiaircraft guns and the SA-3 system, in addition to MIG-21 jet fighters, MI-8 helicopters, and various ground forces weaponry. By the end of 1971, Syria had received 179 MIG jet fighters, more than 25 SU-7 fighter bombers, 22 MI-8 helicopters, about 575 tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers, and 785 artillery pieces. (For examples of this equipment, see the photographs, Figures 3-6.) Soviet military deliveries reached a peak of \$100 million in 1971 (see Table 2).


Table 2

Estimated Communist Military Aid  
Deliveries to Syria

	Million US \$						
	<u>1956-71</u>	<u>1967-71</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Total	646	296	50	38	37	61	110
USSR	573	268	48	35	35	50	100
Eastern Europe	71	26	2	3	2	10	9
China	2	2	-	-	-	1	1

4. Another agreement probably was signed in May 1972, but details are not known.

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Figure 3. ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun





Figure 4. Syrian air force MIG-17 jet that landed in Israel in August 1968




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Figure 5. Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter

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**Figure 6. Soviet SU-7 fighter bomber**

8. Since mid-1967, East European countries have concluded five military aid agreements with Syria totaling nearly \$50 million. Czechoslovakia, which extended \$37 million, has delivered more than 100 T-54 tanks and 20 L-29 MAYA training aircraft. Poland agreed to provide \$10 million for tanks in 1970 and East Germany provided token assistance.

**Terms of Repayment**

9. Moscow sells Damascus arms at low prices and on favorable terms. Discounts from list prices average about 45% for most weapons systems. Repayment varies from five to ten years at 2% interest and generally is made in Syrian commodities. By the end of 1971, Damascus had repaid some \$65 million on its arms debt to the USSR, about 20% of the amount owed. Repayments reached an estimated high of \$13 million in 1965, but an agreement that year rescheduled the remaining debt over 15 years. In 1968 the USSR agreed to a moratorium on principal payments during 1969-72; interest payments averaging \$3 million a year, however, are continuing.

**Military Technical Assistance**

10. Under the military technical assistance program, Syrian personnel are trained in Communist countries. By the end of 1971, more than 1,500 Syrians had received such training, about 1,150 in the USSR.

11. The number of Communist (mainly Soviet) military technicians in Syria has varied with the flow of arms. These technicians generally deliver, assemble, and maintain military equipment; train Syrian personnel in tactics and in the operation and maintenance of equipment; and serve as advisers to staff and line military officers. Their numbers, which varied between

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100 and 400 until 1967, jumped to an estimated 1,100 after the June 1967 War. By 1971, about 800 military technicians, all Soviet, still were employed in Syria. The cost - estimated at nearly \$6 million in 1971 - represents a current account outlay since Moscow rarely provides credit for such purposes.

#### Amount and Character of Communist Economic Aid

12. Communist countries have extended Syria nearly \$485 million of economic assistance since early in 1955 (see Table 3), making them the largest source of foreign capital for Syrian economic development. The Soviet Union has committed nearly \$235 million, Eastern Europe some \$190 million, and China about \$60 million.

13. Czechoslovakia and East Germany extended the first Communist aid, a number of credits for small industrial plants, in 1955-56. The first large credit, however, was some \$170 million from the USSR in 1957 for various development projects. This was later reduced to \$100 million when Moscow decided in 1960 not to undertake the Euphrates Dam. In 1966 the Soviets again reversed themselves and extended a \$133 million credit for the dam's construction.

14. Nearly all Communist economic aid has been for project construction. About 30% has been channeled into major power and irrigation projects. An estimated 20% has gone for industrial development (exclusive of the petroleum industry), 15% for petroleum and phosphate development, and 15% for transportation and communications facilities.<sup>(5)</sup>

#### The Euphrates River Project

15. The largest Communist-aided power and irrigation undertaking (about \$140 million extended) is the Euphrates River project (see the photograph, Figure 7). The World Bank surveyed this project in 1955, but Moscow was the first to provide aid. (For Soviet-assisted projects, see the map.) An estimated \$70 million was included for construction in the 1957 credit. After completing a \$1.3 million survey, however, Moscow withdrew. While the Soviets never disclosed their reasons, the inability of riparian countries - Syria, Iraq, and Turkey - to settle the water distribution question probably was a major factor.

16. In June 1961, Syria concluded a \$120 million agreement with West Germany for construction of the project. Bonn, however, reconsidered the scope of its aid, after the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian union later that year, and reduced the credit to less than \$90 million. The West Germans

5. For a list of Communist-aided projects in Syria, see Table 8.

Table 3

## Communist Economic Aid Extended to Syria

	Million US \$									
	<u>1955-72</u>	<u>1955-60</u>	<u>1961-65</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972<sup>a</sup></u>
Total	483.9	125.2	47.6	216.8	0	25.0	25.0	N.A.	0.3	44.0
USSR	<u>233.6</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>133.3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0</u>
Eastern Europe	<u>190.0</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>31.3</u>	<u>83.5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Bulgaria	15.0			15.0						
Czecho-slovakia	57.2	22.5	5.2	29.5						
East Germany	53.8	2.7	1.1	25.0			25.0			
Hungary	14.0			14.0						
Poland	25.0		25.0							
Romania	25.0					25.0				
China	<u>60.3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>44.0</u>

a. January-June.

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



Figure 7. Euphrates Dam under construction by the Soviets

#### Major Soviet Assisted Projects in Syria



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continued to drag their feet, largely because of doubts over Syria's ability to finance its share of the cost and to repay the credits. After more than five years of such frustration, Damascus again turned to Moscow.

17. In addition to a dam about 200 feet high and 1.5 miles long at Tabaqah, the project includes a 300,000-kilowatt powerplant, irrigation facilities for some 575,000 acres, electric power transmission lines, auxiliary railroads, a small city, and a technical training center. Moscow's credit will cover about half the estimated \$260 million cost, presumably the foreign exchange portion. An estimated 12,000 personnel, including about 1,000 Soviet technicians, currently are employed on the project, which is scheduled for completion in 1975.

**Petroleum Development**

18. About \$60 million have been channeled into Syria's oil industry. Moscow committed about \$18 million in 1957 for exploration, and later helped develop three oilfields in As Suwayda, Qarah Shuk, and Rumaylay. Crude oil production from these fields totaled 5.5 million metric tons in 1971 and is expected to reach 12 million tons by 1975, yielding an estimated annual gross income of nearly \$80 million. Moscow signed additional contracts early in 1971 for a seismic survey and development of the Al Jebissa oilfield and probably will construct a pipeline and associated storage facilities from the oilfields to the port of Tartus. Czechoslovakia extended more than \$40 million to construct and subsequently expanded the Hims oil refinery. The plant, with an annual capacity of 2.7 million tons, now meets most of Syria's requirements.

**Phosphate Development**

19. Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania are providing at least \$10 million to develop Syria's phosphate industry. Three extraction plants are expected to produce over 1.2 million tons of low-grade phosphates annually. A Romanian-built plant with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons already is in operation. Nearly all the production of these plants will be exported to Eastern Europe, mainly as aid repayment. Estimated income from phosphate exports is expected to reach some \$6 million annually.

**Railroad Construction**

20. The 1957 Soviet agreement included some \$40 million to construct a 420-mile railroad linking Al Qamishli in the northeast with the port of Latakia, including a trunk line south to Hims-Akkari. Work on the project was not begun until early in the 1960s and apparently still has not been completed. The USSR also is building a line connecting Tartus and Tudmur, the location of large phosphate deposits, and is providing

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locomotives and railway cars valued at some \$12 million. Financing arrangements for the rolling stock are not known but they probably are under long-term credits.

Drawings

21. By the end of 1971, more than \$260 million of Communist economic assistance had been drawn. An estimated \$170 million have been drawn on Soviet aid and more than \$55 million on Czechoslovak aid. Drawings rose slowly during the early years of the program. They averaged about \$11 million annually during 1961-65, continued to rise slowly the next two years, and surged to nearly \$40 million annually during 1968-70 because of sizable deliveries for the Euphrates project.

Economic Aid Repayments

22. Soviet credits to Syria are repayable in local goods over 12 years at 2.5% interest. East European terms vary from seven to 12 years at 2.5% interest largely in commodities; most require downpayments, with a few as high as 30%. By the end of 1971, Syria had paid an estimated \$18 million on its Soviet economic debt and some \$8 million on its East European debt, practically all in agricultural commodities.

23. Although Syria's total foreign debt service ratio was a low 6% in 1970, its poor financial position compelled Damascus to ask Moscow for a rescheduling. Moscow deferred the 1970 principal payment and in the following year postponed 1971-75 principal payments until 1984-86. Annual interest payments, however, continue to be made on schedule. East European debts have not been rescheduled.

Economic Aid Financing for Syria's Development Plan

24. Communist aid deliveries represented about 17% of public sector investments during the 1966-70 development plan and Western sources about 3%. Syria's reliance on foreign financing, however, is expected to increase during the current development plan. The Third Five-Year Plan (1971-75) calls for \$1.5 billion of public investment. About \$420 million are earmarked for major irrigation projects, including completion of the Euphrates Dam and \$170 million for petroleum development. Estimated capital requirements have increased substantially, but the growth of domestic revenues has slowed while military-related expenditures have remained high. Thus, foreign capital inflow probably will have to exceed the current projections of \$75 million annually if a substantial part of the plan is to be implemented. The Communist countries are likely to continue as a source of large-scale aid.

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Non-Communist Economic Aid

25. During 1959-71, Syria received about \$75 million from non-Communist sources. In the past two years, however, there have been indications of Syrian interest in developing a greater inflow of Western official and private capital. In recent years, Syria has accepted \$38 million in Kuwaiti aid, including a \$28 million grant in 1972. Late in 1971, Syria applied to the International Development Association for a \$12 million credit for highway construction -- only its second request for a credit from a multilateral lending agency. Syrian officials ostensibly are encouraging foreign private investment and are studying French offers to invest in food processing and plastics plants worth more than \$40 million.

Technical Assistance

26. Communist technical assistance has increased steadily since the early 1960s. The number of economic technicians employed in Syria reached more than 1,100 in 1971 (see Table 4), most of them Soviet personnel working on the Euphrates project. The salaries and expenses of these technicians -- estimated at about \$8 million in 1971 -- are covered by Soviet credits. The number of Soviet personnel has increased during the first few months of 1972 and some 1,300 are expected to be employed during the year. The number of East European technicians has ranged between 150 and 200 annually since 1966. There were an estimated 60 Chinese technicians working on a textile mill in 1971.

Table 4

Communist Economic Technicians  
in Syria

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>China</u>
1966	515	350	150	15
1967	760	545	200	15
1968	860	650	200	10
1969	860	650	150	60
1970	1,000	780	160	60
1971	1,130	910	160	60

27. Nearly 3,700 Syrian students and technicians have received training in Communist countries since 1956 (see Table 5), about 50% since

**SECRET****Table 5****Estimated Number of Students and Technical Trainees  
from Syria Trained in Communist Countries**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Academic Students</u>			<u>Technical Trainees</u>		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>
<b>Departures</b>						
1956-71	2,885	1,300	1,585	790	245	545
<b>Being trained<sup>a</sup></b>						
1966	400	250	150	--	--	--
1967	285	210	75	25	25	--
1968	235	210	25	60	35	25
1969	805	510	295	320	75	245
1970	1,290	625	665	30	30	--
1971	1,435	770	665	100	50	50

a. As of December of the stated year.

1968. Some 58% have trained in East European countries and the rest in the USSR.

**Impact of Communist Aid on Syria's Trade**

28. As the Communist aid program has expanded, Syrian trade with the donor countries also has grown. Communist trade rose from about \$5 million in 1954 to a peak of \$200 million in 1969 and since 1965 has accounted for about one-third of Syria's total trade (see Table 9, in the Appendix). Deliveries of economic aid during the 1960s accounted for about 30% of Syrian imports from Communist countries, while repayments of economic and military aid accounted for nearly 25% of Syrian exports. The latter would have been much higher in recent years if the USSR had not rescheduled Syria's debts.

29. Syrian imports from Communist countries (nearly 35% of total Syrian imports since the mid-1960s) have consisted largely of machinery and equipment, petroleum products, transportation equipment, ferrous



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metals, and various other manufactured goods. Exports to these countries (more than 30% of total Syrian exports) have been overwhelmingly agricultural products, principally cotton and wool. Phosphates, and possibly oil, are likely to become important exports to Communist countries in the next few years.

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**APPENDIX**

**Statistical Tables**

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Table 6

**Communist Military Aid Agreements with Syria**

		Million US \$		
<u>Date of Agreement</u>	<u>Communist Signatory</u>	<u>Estimated Value of Agreement</u>	<u>Amount of Aid</u>	
			<u>Credits</u>	<u>Discount</u>
1st half 1956	Czechoslovakia	35 <sup>a</sup>	35	-
Nov 1956	USSR	42	14	28
Oct 1957	USSR	75	25	50
Feb 1958	USSR	90	60	30
Mar 1962	USSR	60	30	30
Oct 1963	Czechoslovakia	5	5	-
Oct 1964	USSR	35	18	17
Mar 1965	Czechoslovakia	5	5	-
Apr 1966	USSR	25	13	12
Jul 1967	East Germany	Negl.	-	-
Aug 1967	USSR	100	50	50
Oct 1967	Czechoslovakia	10	10	-
Aug 1968	USSR	75	45	30
May 1969	China	2	2	-
Aug 1969	Czechoslovakia	12	12	-
Apr 1970	Czechoslovakia	15	15	-
2nd half 1970	Poland	10	10	-
2nd half 1970	USSR	40	30	10
Feb 1971	USSR	40	30	10
<b>Total</b>		<b>676</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>267</b>

a. The total agreement was for \$37 million; a \$2 million downpayment was required.

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Table 7

**Major Communist Military  
Equipment Delivered to Syria  
1956-71**

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Units</u>
<b>Land armaments</b>	
Tanks	1,233
Armored personnel carriers	700
Artillery <sup>a</sup>	1,750
Self-propelled guns	150
<b>Naval ships</b>	
Minesweepers	2
Motor torpedo boats	16
Guided missile boats	6
<b>Aircraft</b>	
Light jet bombers	6
Jet fighters	340
Helicopters	38
Other	145
<b>Guided missile systems</b>	
Surface-to-surface, antitank <sup>b</sup>	34
Surface-to-air <sup>c</sup>	10
Air-to-air <sup>d</sup>	138

a. Including recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and mortars over 100-mm in size.

b. Indicating the number of vehicles used as launchers (three missiles per vehicle).

c. Indicating the number of SAM firing battalions (sites) -- (six launchers per SA-2 site).

d. Indicating the number of fighter aircraft equipped with AAM (two to four per aircraft).

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Table 8

## Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Date Extended</u>	<u>Projects</u>	<u>Amount Extended (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Status<sup>a</sup></u>
Bulgaria	Jun 1966	Line of credit:	15.0	
		Agricultural projects		UC
		Wine distillery		C
		Phosphate industry development		UC
		Tobacco processing machinery		C
		Refrigerated warehousing		C
		Communications project		
Czechoslovakia	1955	2 cement plants	4.5	C
	1955	Sugar refinery, Damascus	1.3	C
	1955	China factory	0.2	C
	Dec 1956	Sugar refinery, Hims	1.3	C
	Mar 1957	Petroleum refinery, Hims	11.3	C
	Dec 1960	Municipal development: 46 electric generators (\$0.4 million)	2.8	C
	Jun 1964	Sugar refinery, Al Ghab	5.2	C
	Dec 1966	Expansion of petroleum refinery, Hims	29.5	C

Table 8

Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project  
(continued)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Date Extended</u>	<u>Projects</u>	<u>Amount Extended (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Status</u>
East Germany	Sep 1955	Weaving mill	0.1	C
	Jul 1956	Cement plant, Aleppo	1.9	C
	Sep 1956	Textile mill	0.4	C
	1957	Shoe factory, Hims	0.2	C
	1957	Hospital equipment	0.1	C
	1965	Equipment for Euphrates River	1.1	C
	Apr 1966	Line of credit:	25.0	
		Foundry		
		Port equipment		
		Water purification and storage equipment (\$0.6 million)		
		Cement plant equipment		
		Power transmission equipment		
		Paper mill equipment		
		5 automatic flour mills		UC
		Highway construction equip- ment (\$3.6 million)		UC
		Aid to higher education (\$5.5 million)		UC
		Tobacco plant		UC
		Prefab housing plant		UC
	Jul 1969	Credit added to 1966 credit	25.0	

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Table 8

Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project  
(continued)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Date Extended</u>	<u>Projects</u>	<u>Amount Extended (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Status</u>
Hungary	Aug 1966	Line of credit:	14.0	
		Telephone network (\$1.0 million)		C
Poland	Jun 1965	Line of credit:	25.0	
		Slaughter house, Aleppo (\$0.8 million)		UC
		Phosphate exploitation (\$4.8 million)		UC
		Steel rolling mill, Hamah (\$5.0 million)		C
		Spinning mill, Aleppo		UC
		Iron ore exploration		
		Glassware plant		
		Telephone assembly plant		C
China	May 1963	Line of credit:	16.3	
		Commodities (\$8.1 million)		C
		Cotton textile mill, Hamah (\$3.6 million)		C
		Yarn spinning mill		C
	May 1972	Line of credit:	44.0	

Table 8

Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project  
(continued)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Date Extended</u>	<u>Projects</u>	<u>Amount Extended (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Status</u>
Romania	Jun 1968	Credit - machinery and equipment	25.0	
		Oil pumps (\$0.3 million)		UC
		2 phosphate plants, Khunayfis (\$1.3 million)		C
USSR	Oct 1957	Line of credit:	100.0	
		Euphrates Valley surveys (\$1.3 million)		C
		Orontes River and Al Ghab Valley development		C
		Other agricultural surveys (\$3.6 million)		UC
		Latakia-Qamishli railroad projects (\$40.0 million)		UC
		Nitrate fertilizer factory, Hims (\$13.5 million)		C
		Petroleum exploration and geological surveys (\$17.8 million)		UC
		Pipeline design		C
		Forestry research center, Latakia		C
		Dry farming research center		UC

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Table 8

Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project  
(continued)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Date Extended</u>	<u>Projects</u>	<u>Amount Extended (Million US \$)</u>	<u>Status</u>
USSR (cont'd)		Cotton research center, Ar Raqqa		C
		Rastan electric power station (\$1.2 million)		C
		Topographical survey (\$0.5 million)		C
		Geological studies (\$1.0 million)		C
		Bridge studies		C
		Concrete reinforcing rod plant		C
		Petroleum products storage		C
	Dec 1966	Euphrates Dam, Tabaqah	133.3	UC
	Jul 1969	Credit - irrigation projects	<sup>b</sup>	
	1970	Credit - telecommunications equipment	<sup>b</sup>	UC
	Feb 1971	Grant - experimental farm	0.3 <sup>c</sup>	UC

- a. Symbols used in status column have the following meanings: C - completed; UC - under construction.  
b. The amount extended is not known.  
c. Minimum estimated value.

Table 9

## Syrian Trade with Communist Countries

Year	Million US \$				Estimated Economic Aid Drawings		Estimated Economic and Military Aid Repayments	
	Total World Trade	Total Communist Trade	Imports from Communist Countries	Exports to Communist Countries	Million US \$	Percent of Communist Exports to Syria	Million US \$	Percent of Communist Imports from Syria
1960	359	41	19	22				
1961	309	47	19	28	9	47	5	23
1962	402	71	31	40	11	35	6	21
1963	424	94	32	62	12	38	7	18
1964	411	113	41	72	1	27	11	18
1965	381	97	38	59	14	37	16	22
1966	462	148	87	61	20	23	18	31
1967	419	140	94	46	22	23	16	26
1968	489	163	120	43	40	33	12	26
1969	576	201	126	75	32	25	14	33
1970	563	171	114	57	44	39	10	13
							14	25